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SECURITIES LAW: SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW OF
REMEDIES, DEFINITIONS, STANDING AND
SANCTIONS
MICHAEL B. ROCHE*
RICHARD T. ZWIRNER** ***
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
long stood at the forefront of innovation in applying the federal securi-
ties laws.' An example of this is the unique nature of the relief granted
this term 2 by the Seventh Circuit in Wright v. Heizer Corp.3 While this
term was otherwise a relatively quiet one in the Seventh Circuit,4 the
court did render one decision with potentially significant overtones and
two others which merit discussion in some detail. This article will dis-
cuss the relief granted in Wright and these three other Seventh Circuit
decisions.
THE RELIEF GRANTED IN WRIGHT V HEIZER CoRp.
One of the most fascinating and challenging issues arising under
the federal securities laws, and one of the least discussed by commenta-
tors generally, is the determination of the appropriate remedy for viola-
tions of those laws. In I. Case Co. v. Borak,5 a case arising under
section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,6 the United States
Supreme Court described the broad scope of relief which federal courts
are authorized to grant under the federal securities laws. In so doing,
the Court stated:
* Partner, Hubachek, Kelly, Rauch & Kirby, P.C.; A.B. and J.D., University of Notre
Dame.
** Partner, Hubachek, Kelly, Rauch & Kirby, P.C.; B.A., University of Michigan; J.D.,
Northwestern University.
*** The authors extend their grateful appreciation to Thomas J. Dillon for his able and
thorough assistance in connection with this article.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78kk (1976).
2. The period herein referred to as the term runs from September 1, 1977, to May 31, 1978.
3. 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
4. In the immediately preceding term the Seventh Circuit issued some major decisions. See,
e.g., Daniel v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232
(1978) and Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of these
cases see Curley & Marciniak, Securities Law, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 498, 498-511 (1977) [herein-
after referred to as Curley & Marciniak].
5. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the 1934 ActI.
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We, therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it is the duty
of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose . . . It is for the federal
courts "to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief"
where federally secured rights are invaded. 7
Similarly, the Supreme Court brought into focus the encompassing
nature of relief available under the antifraud provisions of the 1934
Act8 in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.9 Speaking for the majority, Jus-
tice Harlan stated:
In devising retrospective relief for violation of the proxy rules, the
federal courts should consider the same factors that would govern the
relief granted for any similar illegality or fraud. One important fac-
tor may be the fairness of the terms of the merger. ... In selecting
a remedy the lower courts should exercise "'the, sound discretion
which guides the determinations of courts of equity,"' keeping in
mind the role of equity as "the instrument for rce adjustment and
reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well
as between competing private claims."' 0
Pursuant to these directives, the relief traditionally granted by
lower federal courts in securities fraud cases has included awards of
money damages," accountings 12 and injunctions against the consum-
mation of mergers and other transactions tainted by violations.13 Only
in the rarest of circumstances-under what typically involve compli-
cated facts and circumstances-have the courts sought to revise the
terms of illegal transactions to comport with their idea of fairness or
with what they believe is "necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose."' 4
7. 377 U.S. at 433.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j, 78r (1976).
9. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
10. Id at 386 (citations omitted).
11. See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1051 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982, 991 (7th Cir. 1976); Madi-
gan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239 (7th Cir. 1974); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478
F.2d 1281, 1305 (2d Cir. 1973).
12. See, e.g., Mueller v. Korholz, 449 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Wolff v.
Korholz, 405 U.S. 922 (1972); Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aft'd in part, rev'd
inpart, 363 F.2d 507 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
13. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972); Latta
v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 356 F.2d 103, 103 (9th Cir. 1965), ceri. denied, 384 U.S. 940
(1966); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Pig'N Whistle Corp., 359 F. Supp. 219, 221 (N.D. I11.
1973). See also SEC v. Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193, 200 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.
v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1973).
14. 396 U.S. at 386. For example, the Second Circuit indirectly attempted to do this in Chrs-
Craft Indus., Inc. Y. Piper AirCraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 430
U.S. 1, reh. denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977), when it enjoined the parties from voting shares they had
acquired as a result of their securities laws violations. Without the injunction, the control of the
corporation would have been significantly altered.
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Departing from this tradition and consistent with its innovative
application of the federal securities laws, as early as 1973, the Seventh
Circuit laid the foundation for revising transactions found illegal under
the Securities Act of 1933.15 In Swanson v. American Consumers Indus-
tries, Inc.,16 Judge Cummings stated that the lodestar for revising an
illegal transaction under the federal securities laws was its fairness.
However, the court went on to find that the terms of the transaction in
issue, a merger, were fair and reasonable at the time it was effected.
Accordingly, the court denied relief which would have operated as a
revision of the terms of the merger. 17 It was not until 1977, in Wright v.
Heizer Corp. ,18 that the Seventh Circuit actually employed the fairness
standard previously formulated in Swanson to unravel and revise a se-
curities transaction which had been accomplished in violation of the
federal securities laws.
Wright grew out of a series of five transactions between Interna-
tional Digisonics Corporation 9 and Heizer Corporation, an investor
and eventually the controlling shareholder in I.D.C. I.D.C. was
formed to provide an electronic monitoring system for television com-
mercials. This system provided the means for advertising agencies to
verify that their advertisers' commercials had in fact been aired at the
proper times. Persistent technical and monetary shortcomings forced
I.D.C. to call upon Heizer for financial assistance. This financing was
furnished in five separate, but related, transactions between November
1969 and June 1973. These transactions consisted primarily of
purchases by Heizer of I.D.C. preferred stock and of loans by Heizer to
I.D.C. In the course of these transactions, Heizer gained control of
I.D.C. In order to understand the relief granted by the district court, it
is necessary to be familiar with the five transactions involved. 20
In the first transaction, Heizer purchased preferred stock of I.D.C.,
accompanied by warrants to purchase common stock, for $1,000,000,
and agreed to loan $500,000 to I.D.C. for one year. The exercise price
of the warrants was set at $8.50 per share and there was added to the
warrants an "antidilution clause" which would result in readjustment
of the exercise price down, and the number of shares of common stock
available to Heizer up, if I.D.C. sold common stock at less than $8.50
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the 1933 Act].
16. 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973).
17. Id. at 520.
18. 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). This article will empha-
size the relief aspects of the Wright decision. For a more general discussion of this case see Curley
& Marciniak, supra note 4, at 514-16.
19. Hereinafter referred to as I.D.C.
20. See 560 F.2d at 242-45.
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per share. I.D.C. also agreed not to pledge the stock of its profitable
subsidiary, T & R, or to change the nature of its business without
Heizer's consent.
In the second transaction, Heizer invested $2,000,000 in two
$1,000,000 takedowns on the same general basis as the first transaction.
Heizer was to receive more I.D.C. preferred stock and warrants with an
exercise price of $6.00 per share or, if I.D.C. failed to meet certain
conditions by the time of the second takedown, $4.00 per share. The
warrants had the same "antidilution clause" as the earlier warrants,
although Heizer waived its rights under the clause in the first set of
warrants so that their exercise price stayed at $8.50 per share.
In the third transaction, Heizer invested $1,700,000 of which
$500,000 was used by I.D.C. to repay the loan from Heizer. Heizer
received a twenty-year note and warrants with an exercise price of
$3.60 per share. The "antidilution clauses" in the earlier warrants were
partially triggered and Heizer became entitled to purchase I.D.C. com-
mon stock, constituting 61% of I.D.C.'s total equity, at $3.60 per share.
Additionally, at this time two Heizer officers became directors of I.D.C.
These first three transactions were unanimously approved by I.D.C.'s
board of directors and stockholders.
In the fourth transaction, Heizer agreed on November 19, 1971, to
loan I.D.C. $600,000. If this amount was not repaid by March 31, 1972,
it was to be converted into common stock at $1.00 per share and the
"antidilution clauses" from the first three transactions were to be trig-
gered, enabling Heizer to purchase eighty-five per cent of I.D.C.'s eq-
uity at $1.00 per share. I.D.C.'s charter had to be amended to increase
the amount of authorized common stock to facilitate any purchases by
Heizer of additional shares at the $1.00 price. This was accomplished
by obtaining written consents permitted under the Delaware General
Corporation Law from a sufficient number of stockholders. On March
13, 1972, Heizer lent I.D.C. an additional $250,000 on basically the
same terms. The loans were not repaid by March 31, 1972, and Heizer
gained the right to purchase common stock at $1.00 per share. In addi-
tion, three Heizer nominees formally took control of I.D.C.'s board and
later elected a fourth director over the objection of the non-Heizer di-
rector. Over the next year Heizer extended an additional $2,015,000 to
I.D.C. in the form of demand loans.
In the fifth transaction, 21 Heizer took as security for its demand
21. The fifth transaction was consummated after the bench trial in the district court. How-
ever, in the final opinion, this transaction was considered by the court. See text accompanying
notes 25-26, infra.
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loans a pledge of all of the stock of T & R. In return, Heizer agreed to
postpone demand on various loans and to lend a minimum of $460,000
and a maximum of $1,181,700 to I.D.C. from June 1973 to the end of
1973. These loans were repayable on January 1, 1974. These last two
transactions were approved by I.D.C.'s board of directors.
In October 1972, between the fourth and fifth transactions, minor-
ity and other stockholders of I.D.C. brought an action against Heizer.
They charged that after Heizer had gained control of I.D.C., it had
violated section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 22 and rule lOb-5 23 promulgated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission thereunder, by failing to
disclose its controlling position to I.D.C. stockholders and by improp-
erly valuing I.D.C. stock in the three prior transactions.24
After a bench trial, the district court held that there were no fed-
eral securities law violations in connection with the first three transac-
tions.25 As for the fourth and fifth transactions, however, Judge
Prentice Marshall, after careful scrutiny, found that Heizer had
breached a fiduciary duty owed to I.D.C. and that these breaches con-
stituted violations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 26 The district court
then directed its efforts to fashioning relief in connection with the
fourth and fifth transactions while leaving the first three transactions
essentially intact.
In revising the fourth transaction, Judge Marshall eliminated the
convertibility feature of the notes and enjoined Heizer from converting,
or attempting to convert, any notes to shares of I.D.C. common stock.27
Judge Marshall then declared void the charter amendment which au-
thorized an increase in the number of shares of common stock. Judge
Marshall also voided all provisions which would allow Heizer to exer-
cise the previously acquired warrants at a price below $3.60 per share.28
Accompanying this action was an injunction preventing Heizer from
attempting to enforce the voided provisions of the fourth transaction. 29
As for the fifth transaction, the district court voided the agreement
by which I.D.C. had pledged its stock in T & R as security for various
loans previously extended by Heizer to I.D.C. and ordered Heizer to
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
24. 560 F.2d at 244.
25. 411 F. Supp. 23, 35 (N.D. I11. 1975), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
26. Id. at 36-37.




release any security interest it had acquired in the T & R stock. 30
Heizer was further enjoined from attempting to enforce the pledge
agreement in any way.31 Finally, Judge Marshall found it necessary to
enjoin Heizer from entering into any future transaction with I.D.C.
"except upon terms and conditions as shall be fair and equitable. ' 32
After Judge Marshall had rendered his decision, Heizer proposed
a plan of recapitalization to I.D.C.'s stockholders and "threatened to
put [I.D.C.] into bankruptcy if the plan was not approved by them. '33
The district court enjoined implementation of the plan pending appeal
to the Seventh Circuit. The district court also entered an injunction at
that time preventing Heizer from collecting any interest or principal on
loans it had made to I.D.C. 34 While Wright was on appeal to the Sev-
enth Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green. 35 Although the Seventh Circuit found Judge Marshall's reason-
ing for imposing liability to be erroneous in light of this decision, it
nevertheless affirmed his finding of liability associated with the fourth
and fifth transactions on other grounds.36
In focusing upon the proper relief to be afforded, the Seventh Cir-
cuit, speaking through Judge Tone, found the controlling standard to
be the one previously set forth in Mi&ls. 37 Judge Tone summarized that
principle as follows:
In granting relief in a case such as this, a court of equity should at-
tempt to return the parties to the status quo ante, unraveling transac-
tions effected through violations of Rule lOb-5 to the extent that it
may do so fairly and without injuring the rights of innocent parties.38
Upon review of the relief granted by the district court, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the cancellation of the conversion feature of the notes
in the fourth transaction and the cancellation of the charter amend-
ment increasing the number of authorized shares of I.D.C. common
stock. The court also affirmed the nullification by the district court of
30. Id. at 37-38.
31. Id. at 38.
32. Id.
33. 560 F.2d at 253.
34. 1d.
35. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
36. The Seventh Circuit ruled that, in light of Sante Fe, the district court's finding of a breach
of fiduciary duty would not alone be sufficient to support a finding of liability. Applying the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Sante Fe, the Seventh Circuit found it was necessary that there be
some deception or non-disclosure, along with a breach of fiduciary duty, before there would be a
violation of section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
The Seventh Circuit concluded, however, that Heizer had also failed to disclose material informa-
tion which, independent of any breach of fiduciary duty, constituted a violation of section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5. 560 F.2d at 246.
37. 396 U.S. 376 (1970), noted at 560 F.2d at 252.
38. 560 F.2d at 252.
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the pledge agreement that made up the fifth transaction. In addition,
the court confirmed the injunction preventing Heizer from going ahead
with its proposed plan of recapitalization. 39
Acting upon a petition for supplemental relief not considered by
the district court,4° the Seventh Circuit ruled that the district court, on
remand, should review and adjust the maturities of the loans made by
Heizer to I.D.C. in the fourth and fifth transactions.
The Seventh Circuit itself reviewed the maturity features of the
loans made after the third transaction in order to determine the fairness
of their terms. The court's intent was made clear when, in considering
the propriety of subordinating the loans, it stated: "[T]he only inquiry
that remains is whether the terms of the loans, apart from the converti-
bility feature and the security that have already been nullified, were
fair to IDC and its common shareholders." 4' The court found that
since the maturity features were no more than a "heads-I-win-tails-
you-lose-series of transactions" they were unfair and "should be ad-
justed to make them commensurate with IDC's ability to pay."' 42
With respect to the prospective relief granted by the district court,
Heizer had contended that the injunction issued preventing it from en-
tering into any agreement with I.D.C. which is not "fair and equitable"
was too vague. The Seventh Circuit deleted that provision and placed
in its stead directions to Heizer.43 The injunction as modified by the
Seventh Circuit provided that Heizer disclose to I.D.C. any and all ma-
terial facts concerning further securities transactions it might propose.
The Seventh Circuit further enjoined Heizer from entering into
any securities transaction with I.D.C. which did not have the approval
of the majority of I.D.C. stockholders other than Heizer or, in the alter-
native, the approval of the district court or another court having juris-
diction to make a determination that the proposed transaction would
be fair and equitable.44 The Seventh Circuit then relieved Heizer of
the restriction imposed by the district court requiring Heizer to pay
$3.60 per share of I.D.C. common stock upon exercise of its warrants. 4
Rather than returning the parties to the status quo ante within the
meaning of the standard enunciated in Mills, the relief granted by the
39. Id. at 252-55.
40. The district court refused to consider the petition for supplemental relief on the basis that
it was not timely filed. However, the Seventh Circuit disagreed in the modified opinion and con-
sidered the merits of the petition. See 560 F.2d at 253-54.
41. Id. at 254.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 255-56.
44. Id. at 256.
45. Id.
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Seventh Circuit placed the parties in different positions within the
structure of the fourth and fifth transactions. 46 An argument to this
effect was made by Heizer in its unsuccessful petition for a writ of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court.47 In this petition Heizer argued that the
action taken by the Seventh Circuit went beyond "unraveling" the
financing transactions and amounted to "restructuring" them-action
which is beyond the power of a federal court.48 According to Heizer, a
federal court acting under the federal securities laws is empowered to
void a transaction, but not to modfy it.49 While Heizer's characteriza-
tion of the relief granted as a "restructuring" rather than an "unrav-
eling" is accurate, under the plain and explicit mandate of the Supreme
Court in Borak and Mills it seems clear that a federal court is empow-
ered to do either.
By the Seventh Circuit's decisive action, Heizer's control over
I.D.C. was lessened and I.D.C.'s obligations to Heizer were reduced to
a level more commensurate with I.D.C.'s ability to operate. In effect,
the court significantly altered the original bargain struck by the parties.
As a result, many of the risks in the transactions were shifted from
I.D.C., where they were originally placed by the agreements between
the parties, to Heizer.
Wright stands as a signal to all parties entering into agreements
and transactions subject to the standards set forth in the federal securi-
ties laws that a violation of those laws may very well result in a judicial
balancing of the terms of the original agreement, as an alternative to an
award of money damages or the entry of injunctive relief. If the origi-
nal agreement is found to be "unfair," the court may modify or substi-
tute new terms for those negotiated and agreed to by the parties.
THE DEFINITION OF A SECURITY IN HIRK . AGpI-RESEARCH
COUNCIL, INC.
In Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc. ,50 the Seventh Circuit held
that a sharing or pooling of funds is required to form an "investment
contract" within the meaning of the statutory definitions of "security"
in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.51 This opinion reaffirms the Seventh Cir-
46. E.g., the maturity dates of the loans were to be "adjusted to make them commensurate
with IDC's ability to pay." Id. at 254. See text accompanying notes 40-42, supra.
47. The petition was denied on February 21, 1978. See 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
48. Heizer's Brief for Certiorari at 26-28.
49. Id.
50. 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(l), 78c(a)(iO) (1976).
SECURITIES LAW
cuit's decision in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities52 and the interpretation
the Milnarik court placed on the tripartite test set forth by the Supreme
Court in SEC v. WI. Howey Co. 13
In his original complaint, Hirk charged that he was fraudulently
induced to enter into a written trading agreement with Agri-Research
Council Inc.,54 a company engaged in managing discretionary futures
trading accounts. In reliance on various misrepresentations concerning
the defendants' expertise and their failure to inform Hirk of the high
risk nature of his investment, the plaintiff placed $10,000 in a trading
account and executed a power of attorney which authorized an officer
of A.R.C.O. to trade in his account as his agent and attorney-in-fact.
Hirk lost his $10,000 initial investment as well as an additional $17,800
which was charged to his account to cover other trading losses.
Hirk alleged that the written discretionary trading agreement and
the power of attorney each constituted an "investment contract" or a
"certificate of interest or participation in a profit sharing agreement,"
thus qualifying each as a "security" under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.55
Accordingly, under Hirk's theory, the defendants were liable to him for
violations of the securities laws because they had not registered these
securities as required by section 5 of the 1933 Act56 and had not com-
plied with the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts 57 or the
rules promulgated thereunder.58
Count I of Hirk's original complaint was dismissed by the district
court on the ground that his arrangement with the defendants was not
an "investment contract," and therefore not a "security," because the
necessary element of "common enterprise" was lacking. 59 Hirk then
amended count I alleging that the defendants handled all their discre-
tionary trading accounts in such a fashion that Hirk participated with
the other account holders "as if' all their funds were commingled. The
district court dismissed count I, as amended, on the ground that the
requisite element of a "common enterprise" was absent, "especially in
light of plaintiffs claim that such treatment was in direct contravention
52. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
53. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
54. Hereinafter referred to as A.R.C.O.
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78c(a)(10) (1976).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j(b), 780(c) (1976).
58. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240. lOb-5, 240.15c1-2, 15cl-7 (1978).
59. While Hirk's claim in count I was based upon his theory that the written trading agree-
ment and the written power of attorney each constituted a "security," the Seventh Circuit consid-
ered the two together as comprising "the arrangement" with A.R.C.O. 561 F.2d at 99.
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of defendants' representations and plaintiffs expectations." 60
In dismissing count I, both in its original and amended forms, the
district court relied solely upon the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc. 61 In Mi/narik, the Seventh Circuit
had held that before a trading agreement could qualify as a "security,"
a "common enterprise" must be shown to exist. That is, there must be
present multiple investors whose funds are pooled together for the
same purpose so that the holders of all similar accounts may be consid-
ered joint participants in the same investment enterprise.
At the outset of the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Hirk, Judge Cum-
mings recognized that in order to reverse the dismissal of Hirk's com-
plaint, the court would be required to overrule its decision five years
earlier in Milnarik.62 It declined to do so.
In Milnarik, Judge Stevens (now Supreme Court Justice Stevens)
had held that a contract pursuant to which certain investors deposited
their funds with a broker on the understanding that the broker would
use those funds in his sole discretion to trade commodities futures for
their benefit did not constitute a "security" even though the broker had
entered into virtually identical discretionary agreements with other cus-
tomers. Judge Stevens noted that the "common enterprise" element
was required to create a "security" under the test outlined over twenty
years earlier by the Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J Howey Co. 63 Ap-
plying the Howey test to the facts before him, Judge Stevens found that
the success or failure of the trading in the other discretionary accounts
had no direct or economic bearing upon the profitability of the plain-
tiff's account. Since the plaintiff and the other customers of the same
broker were not joint participants in the same investment enterprise, no
"common enterprise" was present.64
Both the Hirk and Milnarik decisions involved an application of
the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Howey. In that landmark
opinion, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Murphy, stated:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by
nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.
60. Id.
61. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
62. 561 F.2d at 99.
63. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
64. 457 F.2d at 276-77.
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...The test is whether the scheme involves an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
efforts of others.65
Under the Howey test for an "investment contract" it is clear, and
it has been repeatedly held, that three distinct elements must be pres-
ent: (1) the investment of money; (2) a common enterprise among sev-
eral investors and (3) the expectation of profits to be derived solely
from the efforts of others.66
While the first element lends itself to easy analysis, the second and
third elements do not. The Supreme Court in Howey did not define
"common enterprise," it did not delineate the emphasis to be accorded
these two elements and it did not specify whether an "investment con-
tract" could arise if one of these elements were absent. In short, other
than to formulate its tripartite test, the Court failed to provide the
lower courts with any additional parameters for application of its test
to constantly changing and often complicated schemes to defraud.
In Milnarik, the Seventh Circuit applied the three-pronged test of
Howey and found that the second element-the existence of a "com-
mon enterprise"-was lacking. Accordingly, it held the trading ac-
count at issue did not involve a "security."
In Hirk, the Seventh Circuit reapplied the literal, almost mechani-
cal approach of Milnarik and held that Hirk simply failed to establish
the second element under the Howey test-the presence of a "common
enterprise." Judge Cummings first reiterated Judge Stevens' preoccu-
pation in Milnarik with the necessity of a "common enterprise." While
Judge Cummings admitted that in Milnarik Judge Stevens had not ex-
pressly decided that the existence of a "common enterprise" subsumes
the existence of a pooling of funds or the sharing of profits on a pro
rata basis,67 he proceeded to conclude that Judge Stevens had neverthe-
less assumed such a pooling or sharing was required under the Howey
test. In doing so, Judge Cummings stated: "It is apparent then that this
Court's decision in Milnarik was based on the assumption that a shar-
ing or pooling of funds is required by Howey, and we are unwilling to
65. 328 U.S. at 298-300. While the Supreme Court in Howey discussed the term "investment
contract" as it appears in the statutory definition of "security" in the 1933 Act, it should be noted
that the definition of "security" under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts is virtually identical. See
United Hous. Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, rea denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975); Nash &
Assocs., Inc. v. Lum's of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1973). In Hirk, Judge Cummings
agreed. 561 F.2d at 99.
66. See, e.g., Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516
(5th Cir. 1974); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1974).
67. Judge Cummings conceded that in Milnarik, the court "did not directly address the pool-
ing issue." 561 F.2d at 100.
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overrule that determination."68 Having conceptually bridged this gap
in his threshold analysis, all that remained was the simple question of
whether Hirk's funds had in fact been pooled or whether Hirk had
shared in profits on a pro rata basis. Since Hirk had not made such
allegations, the court held that this arrangement did not comprise a
"common enterprise." In addition, the court found Hirk's allegation,
in amended count I-that his account was treated "as if" commin-
gled-insufficient on its face to satisfy the pooling requirement. Ac-
cordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ,dismissals of
count I-both in its original form and as amended.69
The question of whether or not the "common enterprise" require-
ment of Howey requires a pooling of funds or sharing of profits has
prompted inconsistent results among the circuits.70 Similar to the Hirk
analysis, several courts have interpreted "common enterprise" as re-
quiring that a relationship exist among investors. Their monies or in-
vestment proceeds are pooled in the same enterprise or the profits
generated by the enterprise are shared by the investors on a pro rata
basis.7 ' This method of determining whether the "common enterprise"
68. Id. at 101.
69. Hirk also claimed that since a clause in his trading agreement required that 25% of the
profits accruing in his account in a one month period were to be paid to A.R.C.O. as compensa-
tion for its advisory services, his trading agreement constituted a "certificate of interest or partici-
pation in a profit sharing agreement" as those terms are used in the statutory definitions of
"security" under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(l), 78c(a)(10) (1976). See text
accompanying note 53, supra. In an abbreviated analysis, Judge Cummings rejected this conten-
tion and held that no distinction exists between "investment contracts" and "profit sharing plans."
Accordingly, since Hirk's arrangement lacked the element of a "common enterprise," it failed to
qualify as a "certificate of interest or participation in a profit sharing agreement," for the same
reasons it had failed to qualify as an "investment contract." 561 F.2d at 102-03. Because this
conclusion was based upon the court's interpretation of the "common enterprise" requirement, an
analysis of this part of the court's decision in Hirk is outside the scope of this article. See Shine,
Commodities Laws: Investor Protection or Abandonment, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 73, 73-9 (1979).
70. In his opinion in Hirk, Judge Cummings recognized one contrary position taken after the
decision in Milnarik by the Fifth Circuit in SEC v. Contintentai Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516
(5th Cir. 1974), and expressly rejected it. 561 F.2d at 101.
71. For example, in Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972),
aff'd without opinion, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973), the district court held that a discretionary trad-
ing account in commodities futures did not, absent an allegation of a pooling of funds among
other investors with similar accounts, constitute a security thereby entitling the investor to sue
under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Similarly, in Consolo v. Hornbower
& Weeks-Hemphill Noyes, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Ohio 1976), it was held that a non-discre-
tionary trading account in commodity futures lacked the required commonality because plaintiff's
investments were independent of all other investors transacting business with the same broker
defendant. The court also emphasized that since the account was non-discretionary, the plaintiff's
profits would not arise "solely from the efforts of others" as required under the Howey test. See
also Jenson v. Continental Fin. Corp., 404 F. Supp. 792 (D. Minn. 1975); Glazer v. National
Commodity Research and Statistical Serv., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Ill.), a'd, 547 F.2d 392
(7th Cir. 1974); Arnold v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
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requirement has been met is sometimes referred to as the "horizontal"
approach.
In contrast to this horizontal approach, other courts have focused
primarily upon the relationship between the investor and the promoter
(or broker) to determine whether the requisite "common enterprise" is
present. Under this test, which may be seen as a balanced fusion of the
second and third elements required by Howey, a "common enterprise"
will be held to exist as long as the fortunes of all investors are tied to
the efforts of the same promoter. Interdependence among investors or
a pro rata sharing of profits or pooling of funds is not required. This
approach is frequently referred to as the "vertical" approach to the
"6common enterprise" requirement. 72
The majority of courts when confronted with the "common enter-
prise" issue have, under analogous facts and circumstances, adopted
the "vertical" approach over the "horizontal" approach.73 The majority
approach appears to be the better reasoned of the two and therefore we
submit that the decision in Hirk is unsound. First, in reaching its con-
clusion in Hirk, and thus reaffirming its rigid adherence to the "hori-
zontal" approach previously enunicated in Milnarik, the Seventh
Circuit misread the Supreme Court's holding in Howey. A careful ex-
amination of the authorities cited in Howey clearly reveals that the
Supreme Court did not intend that the additional requirement of a
pooling of funds or sharing of profits be present to find a "common
enterprise. '74
72. In the leading case espousing the "vertical" approach, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit stated that regardless of whether investor funds are pooled or profits shared, the "common
enterprise" requirement is satisfied if the relationship between investor and broker "is one in
which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success
of those seeking the investment of third parties." Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Glenn W.
Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476; 482 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
Accord, Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.
1974); Plunkett v. Francisco, 430 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1977). See also Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l,
Inc., 498 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1974); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Koscot Interplantetary Inc.,
497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); Nash & Assocs., Inc. v. Lum's of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.
1973).
73. See, e.g., Mahue v. Reynolds and Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (joint account
with a brokerage firm under an agreement whereby the firm would manage the account held to be
an investment contract, notwithstanding the absence of a pooling of funds or a common enterprise
among investors); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., 423 F.
Supp. 168 (C.D. Utah 1975) (arrangement under which investors deposited funds with broker to
be utilized by the broker in its sole discretion in securities trading held to satisfy the "common
enterprise" requirement of Howey and to comprise a "security"); Rochkind v. Reynolds Sec., Inc.,
388 F. Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1975) (commodities contracts purchased by investor in reliance upon
expertise of broker held, standing alone, to constitute "securities"); Marshall v. Lamson Bros. &
Co., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (discretionary commodities trading accounts held to satisfy
the "common enterprise" requirement of Howey even though no pooling of funds or sharing of
profits was present).
74. In imposing a "common enterprise" requirement upon the existence of an investment
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Moreover, in utilizing a literal interpretation of the Howey test, the
Hirk court overlooked the unmistakably clear directive embodied in
the Howey opinion itself. The definition of security "embodies a flex-
ible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to
meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the
use of the money of others on the promise of profits. ' 75 Second, in
reaching the result it did in Hirk, the Seventh Circuit ignored various
Supreme Court admonitions that "the reach of the [Securities] Act does
not stop with the obvious and commonplace" 76 and that "in searching
for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the Act, form
should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on
economic reality. '77
Although other jurisdictions have adopted a flexible and malleable
construction of "common enterprise, '78 the Seventh Circuit has not.
Rather, by its refusal to alter its strict intepretation of the Howey test
and by its allegiance to its decision in Milnarik, the Seventh Circuit has
severely undercut the remedial nature of the federal securities laws. In
addition, the court has eviscerated the usefulness of those laws in
preventing increasingly inventive schemes of modem times. For exam-
ple, under the Seventh Circuit's rationale, a broker who patently mis-
represents the profitability of his account and who fraudulently induces
investors to place their funds with him, for use in his sole discretion,
does not violate the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
contract, the Howey Court relied heavily upon the Minnesota Supreme Court's earlier decision in
State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920). An analysis of that
decision, however, reveals that while a pooling of funds was involved under the facts at issue
there, nowhere did the Minnesota Supreme Court single out that particular element as essential to
the existence of a "common enterprise." This reading of Gopher Tire is buttressed by the decision
of the Minnesota Supreme Court two years later where it upheld the existence of a common
enterprise under facts not involving any pooling of funds or sharing of profits. See State v. Evans,
154 Minn. 95, 191 N.W. 425 (1922). Moreover, no pooling of funds or sharing of profits was
present in two of the other decisions relied upon by the Howey Court. See Prohaska v. Hemmer-
Miller Dev. Co., 256 Ill. App. 331 (1930); SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
We suggest that careful analysis of the relevant authorities and of the legislative purpose
sought to be achieved by the federal securities laws requires that the proper weight to be given the
existence of a pooling of funds is that advanced by Professor Loss who states: "In all these cases
proof of some sort of pooling arrangement among investors. . . helps, but it is not essential." 1
Loss, SEcUIUTIas REoULATION 489 (2d ed. 1961) (footnotes omitted).
75. 328 U.S. at 299.
76. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
77. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
78. See, e.g., Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1974); Securities and Exch.
Comm'n v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); Securities and Exch.
Comm'n v. Koscot Interplanetary Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); Nash & Assocs., Inc. v. Lum's
of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1973); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Plunkett v. Francisco,
430 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1977). All of these cases have adopted the "vertical" view of "com-
mon enterprise."
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Equally troublesome and left unanswered by the Hirk analysis is
the not uncommon situation where, unknown to the investor, his funds
are pooled by his broker with those of other investors and may be used
by the broker for a variety of improper purposes. Among these pur-
poses may be the investment in a security in which the broker has a
financial interest or the undisclosed use of the pooled funds by the bro-
ker for his own interest.
To summarize, the Seventh Circuit has exalted form over sub-
stance. It has imposed very narrow parameters on the definition of a
"security" which frustrate the spirit and purpose underlying the an-
tifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Indeed, future applica-
tion of the Hirk decision may render the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws inoperative with respect to a large number of
creative and ingenuous schemes with endless permutations; schemes in
which unscrupulous brokers or promoters may extract large invest-
ments from hapless investors under the fraudulently represented guise
of earning a profit. This is one of the very evils which the federal secur-
ities laws were designed to prevent. The Seventh Circuit's decision in
Hirk constitutes a narrow application of the federal securities laws de-
cried by the United States Supreme Court on several occasions and
contravenes the avowed goal of affording broad protection to the in-
vesting public.
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
During the period under consideration, the Seventh Circuit also
decided one case arising under the Investment Company Act of 1940,79
Mathers Fund, Inc. v. Colwell Co. 80 In this case, the court held that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to bring an action under the Investment
Act. The court came to this conclusion after reviewing the Act's legis-
lative purpose.
In Mathers Fund, the defendant Colwell Company, a publicly held
corporation engaged in the mortgage finance business, purchased over
five per cent of its own outstanding voting securities from the defend-
ant Mathers Fund Incorporated. 8' The Fund is an open end invest-
ment company registered under the Investment Company Act of
1940.82 Eight months after the purchase, the Fund sought a return of
these shares and tendered to Colwell the original purchase price in ex-
79. is U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Investment Act].
80. 564 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1977).
81. Hereinafter referred to as the Fund.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1976).
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change for their return.s3 After Colwell refused to return the shares
and to accept the Fund's tender of the purchase price, the Fund initi-
ated an action in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois. Pursuant to section 46(b) of the Investment Act,84 the
Fund sought rescission of the purchase and the return of the shares sold
to Colwell.
The gravamen of the Fund's complaint was that immediately prior
to the purchase, the Fund owned more than five per cent of Colwell's
outstanding securities. The Fund contended that under section 2 of the
Investment Act 5 Colwell occupied the status of "an affiliated person"
to the Fund immediately prior to the purchase. Accordingly, Colwell's
purchase from the Fund violated section 17(a)(2) of the Investment Act
which prohibits an "affiliated person" from knowingly purchasing any
security from a registered investment company.8 6 Section 46(b) of the
Investment Act declares any agreement in violation of the Act to be
void. 7 It was on this basis that the Fund sought rescission of the trans-
action.
Colwell moved to dismiss the complaint under rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure88 on the ground that it failed to state
83. Although the opinion is not clear, the Fund's attempt to repurchase the shares was appar-
ently prompted by an increase in their market value after the sale to Colwell Company.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b) (1976).
85. Section 2 of the Investment Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1976) provides:
"Affiliated person" of another means... (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose
outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled or held with
power to vote, by such other person ....
86. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1976) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any affiliated person or promoter of or principal under-
writer for a registered investment company (other than a company of the character de-
scribed in Section 80a-12(d)(3)(A) and (B) of this title), or any afated person of such
person, promoter, or principal underwriter, acting as principal-
(1) knowingly to sell any security or other property to such registered company or
to any company controlled by such registered company, unless such sale mvolves
solely (A) securities of which the buyer is the issuer, (B) securities of which the seller
is the issuer and which are part of a general offering to the holders of a class of its
securities, or (C) securities deposited with the trustee of a unit investment trust or
periodic payment plan by the depositor thereof;
(2) knowingly to purchase from such registered company, or from any company
controlled by such registered company, any security or other property (except secur-
ities of which the seller is the issuer) ....
87. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b) (1976) provides:
(b) Every contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter or of any rule,
regulation, or order thereunder, and every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the
performance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or
practice in violation of, any provision of this subchapter, or any rule, regulation, or order
thereunder shall be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any
such provision, rule, regulation, or order, shall have made or engaged in the performance
of any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a party to
such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the
facts by reason of which the making or performance of such contract was in violation of
any such provision, rule, regulation, or order.
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6).
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a claim upon which relief could be granted. Finding that the Fund was
not an innocent party to Colwell's purchase and that the parties were
therefore in par delicto, Judge Grady granted Colwell's motion and
dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit89 defined the issue before it to be
whether the district court had erred in holding that the Fund was not
entitled to the rescissional relief it requested. 90 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case, but in doing so did not
adopt the district court's reasoning.
At the outset of his opinion, Judge Markey agreed with the argu-
ment that the district court acted improperly in finding the Fund to be
inpari delicto. In doing so, Judge Markey noted the broad implication
of a contrary result. He held that to let the district court's dismissal
stand on the basis that the Fund was in pari delicto "could render §
17(a) a nullity if it were to preclude suit by any investment company
against an affiliate who had purchased securities in apparent violation
[of the Investment Act]." 9'
Judge Markey then affirmed the result reached in the district court
on grounds apparently not even raised in the district court. He first
examined the legislative history of the Investment Act 92 and found its
overall purpose was to protect registered investment companies from
self-dealing and abuse by insiders. In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied upon the prophylactic nature of the Investment Act and
upon the SEC's authority to exempt a transaction otherwise in viola-
tion of section 17(a) if the terms of the agreement at issue are fair and
reasonable and do not involve any overreaching. 93
Judge Markey then turned to an analysis of the complaint to deter-
89. The appeal was decided by a panel consisting of Seventh Circuit Judges Castle and
Wood, and Chief Judge Markey of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals who
was sitting by designation. Judge Markey wrote the opinion. See 564 F.2d at 782.
90. Id. at 783.
91. Id. at 783 n.5.
92. S. REp. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1940).
93. Section 17(b) of the Investment Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1976) provides:
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, any person may file with the Com-
mission an application for an order exempting a roposed transaction of the a plicant
from one or more provisions of said subsection. The Commission shall grant suc appli-
cation and issue such order of exemption if evidence establishes that-
(1) the terms of theproposed transaction, including the consideration to be paid or
received, are reasonable and fair and do not involve overreaching on the part of any
person concerned;
(2) the proposed transaction is consistent with the policy of each registered invest-
ment company concerned, as recited in its registration statement and reports filed
under this subchapter; and
(3) the proposed transaction is consistent with the general purposes of this sub-
chapter.
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mine whether it stated a claim upon which relief could be granted,
when measured against the purpose of the Act-the protection of regis-
tered investment companies against self-dealing and abuse by insiders.
Since the complaint did not allege any overreaching on the part of Col-
well, Judge Markey affirmed the dismissal for failure to state a claim.
In doing so, Judge Markey also focused upon a letter the Fund
had written to the SEC in connection with the Colwell purchase which
had been attached to the Fund's complaint as an exhibit. In.this letter,
the Fund had stated to the SEC that the price per share paid to the
Fund by Colwell had been "fair and reasonable." This simply rein-
forced Judge Markey's conclusion that, by its own admission, the Fund
had not been victimized by any overreaching or self-dealing by insiders
and therefore that the evils which the Investment Act was designed to
remedy were not present. Furthermore, under Judge Markey's analy-
sis, in view of its letter, the Fund could not "in good faith" prove at
trial that Colwell had "overreached. '94
Moreover, Judge Markey held that not only was the Fund's claim
outside the protection of the Act but that granting the relief sought by
the Fund would subvert the very policies the Investment Act was
designed to advance. Judge Markey noted that the Fund was engaging
in "speculation" when it sold the stock to Colwell. To allow it to utilize
the Investment Act to rescind this sale and thus reap a profit upon re-
sale at the presently higher price would, according to Judge Markey, be
inequitable and contrary to the policies of the Investment Act. This
was an additional basis upon which the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the Fund's complaint. 95
To the extent that Judge Markey affirmed the dismissal of the
Fund's complaint for its failure to allege it was within the class of per-
sons protected by the Investment Act, the court's analysis is well rea-
soned and stands on solid ground. However, to the extent the court
determined asfact that the Fund could not prove it was within the
category of persons protected by the Act, the decision would better
have been reached in the context of a trial on the merits where the
Fund would be permitted to explain its letter to the SEC.
REVIEW OF SANCTIONS ENTERED BY SELF-REGULATORY BODIES
In Allan v. Securities and Exchange Commission,96 the plaintiff, a
former registered representative of a member of the New York Stock
94. 564 F.2d at 784.
95. Id.
96. 577 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978).
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Exchange, 97 attempted to stay a sanction imposed on him by the
N.Y.S.E. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal
based on its lack of jurisdiction and sustained the refusal by the SEC to
stay the sanctions of the N.Y.S.E. pending SEC review.
The petitioner, Allan, was a vice president and registered account
representative with Dean Witter & Co.,98 a broker-dealer in securities
registered with the SEC and a member of the N.Y.S.E. During the
annual audit of Dean Witter, approximately $10,000 in principal
amount of bearer bonds which had been purchased for the account of a
customer and a Dean Witter check in the amount of $162.50 represent-
ing interest on the bearer bonds, were discovered to have been misap-
propriated.99 Allan was questioned about this matter and within a
short period of time, he admitted misappropriating the bonds and forg-
ing the check. He was then discharged by Dean Witter.
Approximately a week later, Allan was hired by Loewi and Co.,
also a broker-dealer in securities registered with the SEC and member
of the N.Y.S.E. Allan's application for qualification as a registered rep-
resentative with Loewi was "conditionally approved" subject to the
outcome of the N.Y.S.E.'s investigation into the circumstances sur-
rounding Allan's termination by Dean Witter.' °°
A year later, after formal proceedings before a N.Y.S.E. hearing
panel, the panel voted that Allan be permanently barred from employ-
ment in any capacity with any member of the N.Y.S.E. The panel's
decision was appealed to the N.Y.S.E. board of directors which, after a
hearing, upheld the sanction.' 0 '
Allan then appealed the N.Y.S.E. decision to the SEC, and also
requested a stay of the sanction pending the outcome of his appeal.102
Within two weeks after Allan sought the stay, the SEC denied Allan's
request. Within another week and a half, the SEC denied Allan's re-
newed request for a stay. 0 3
Allan then brought an action in the district court seeking an order
requiring the SEC to stay the sanction imposed by the N.Y.S.E. pend-
ing the SEC's consideration of his appeal. Allan also filed a petition
97. Hereinafter referred to as N.Y.S.E.
98. Hereinafter referred to as Dean Witter.
99. 577 F.2d at 390.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Section 19(d)(2) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2) (1976), provides in pertinent part:
Application to such appropriate regulatory agency for review. . . shall not operate as a
stay of such action unless such appropriate regulatory agency otherwise orders, summa-
rily or after notice and opportunity for hearing on the question of a stay ....
103. 577 F.2d at 391.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit seek-
ing review of the SEC's denial under section 25(a)(1) of the 1934 Act. 104
The district court dismissed Allan's complaint for lack of jurisdic-
tion on the ground that section 25(a)(1) of the 1934 Act precluded juris-
diction in the district court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.10 5 In view
of the plain meaning of section 19(d)(2) of the 1934 Act,' °6 the Seventh
Circuit had no problem reaching the conclusion that, for Allan to merit
entry by the district court of the order he sought, he would have to
demonstrate that the SEC had in effect flouted the will of Congress or
otherwise abused its discretion. After reviewing the facts, the Seventh
Circuit held that Allan had not done so. In discussing the SEC's discre-
tion under section 19(d)(2), Judge Miller stated: "[W]e do not believe a
court should try to outguess the expertise of the administrative agency
in determining when protection of the investing public requires that a
stay of sanctions be denied."' 10 7
The court also denied Allan's petition for direct review in the Sev-
enth Circuit of the SEC's denial of a stay. The court relied on section
25(c)(2) of the 1934 Act which provides in pertinent part:
The filing of a petition under this section does not operate as a stay of
the Commission's order or rule. Until the court's jurisdiction be-
comes exclusive, the Commission may stay its order or rule pendingjudicial review if it finds that justice so requires. 10 8
The Seventh Circuit held simply that this section relates to stays of final
orders or rules of the SEC and that the SEC's denial of Allan's request
for a stay of the N.Y.S.E. sanction was not a final order or rule. Judge
Miller also stated that "in the absence of extraordinary circumstances
not present here," the SEC's denial of the stay was not reviewable by
the Seventh Circuit.109
The Seventh Circuit properly denied Allan's attempts to seek judi-
cial review of the SEC's denial of the stay. The SEC has broad discre-
tion to stay-it can act "summarily" or only after notice and hearing.
There is no substantive standard set forth in section 19(d)(2) of the
1934 Act governing the SEC's exercise of that discretion. Absent such a
standard or abuse of discretion, the SEC's determination as to whether
104. Section 25(a)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (1976), provides in pertinent part:
A person ageved by a final order of the Commission ... may obtain review of the
order in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he resides ....
105. The Seventh Circuit's opinion was written by Judge Miller, Judge of the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals sitting by designation. 577 F.2d at 389.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2) (1976).
107. 577 F.2d at 392.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(c)(2) (1976).
109. 577 F.2d at 393.
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or not to enter a stay should be honored. This result is consistent with
an orderly review of sanctions entered by the N.Y.S.E. and other self-
regulatory bodies subject to review by the SEC.
CONCLUSION
Although this term was a relatively quiet one in the Seventh Cir-
cuit, the court did address one clearly important question and some
other potentially significant issues. In Wright, the Seventh Circuit evi-
denced its willingness to go beyond the general rule of returning the
parties to the status quo ante in fashioning relief for violations of the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws.
In Hirk, the court reaffirmed its narrow interpretation of the
"common enterprise" requirement for finding an "investment contract"
within the statutory definitions of a "security." Unlike the majority of
the lower federal courts, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the impor-
tance of the nature of the relationship among the investors rather than
the nature of the relationship between the investor and the broker.
This narrow interpretation has left a gap in the congressional attempt
to protect securities investors.
In addition, in Mather's Fund, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the
claim of a registered investment company on the basis that the com-
pany had failed to allege facts showing it was within the class to be
protected by the Investment Company Act of 1940. In Allen, the final
opinion discussed in this article, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the
SEC's refusal to stay sanctions entered by a self-regulatory body. The
Seventh Circuit held that district court review of the SEC's denial was
limited to those situations in which the SEC has abused its discretion
and that direct review by the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals
was restricted to final orders or rules of the SEC.

